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1. Brett Lane, Comment, Blowing the Whistle on Balla v. Gambro: The Emergence of an
In-House Counsel’s Cause of Action in Tort for Retaliatory Discharge, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 235,
241 (2005).
2. See JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 1.04, at 1-4
(3d ed. 2000) (tracing the roots of the attorney-client privilege to early Roman times while
finding modern rationale for the privilege originating in the eighteenth century).
3. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (quoting Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).
4. See id. at 390-92; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403 (noting that the attorney-client privilege
encourages candid questioning by clients and compliance with a complicated legal system). 
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NOTES
How the Fifth Circuit Freed Willy and Harpooned
Corporate Ability to Shield Retaliation Suits: A Critique
Twenty Years in the Making
I. Introduction
Societal interests and public policy demand that offensive claims be allowed
by in-house counsel when the attorney has been wrongfully discharged.
Furthermore, these claims should be upheld even when an attorney may have to
introduce evidence that would otherwise be protected by the attorney-client
privilege.  In fact, allowing privilege waiver by in-house counsel to bring
offensive actions may “encourage corporations to conduct their affairs ethically
and in accordance with the law,”1 which is essentially the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege.  
Most legal systems have accepted the attorney-client privilege for centuries,2
with modern acceptance premised on the belief that protecting communication
between attorney and client will “encourage clients to make full disclosures to
their attorneys.”3  Theoretically, promoting full disclosure allows attorneys to
understand the totality of the situation and to give the client sound advice, which
further encourages compliance with the law.4  Communication that facilitates a
crime or fraud is clearly not a desired result and not protected by privilege.
Therefore, compliance with the law must be considered the principal reason for
maintaining the attorney-client privilege.  Consequently, allowing a corporation
to wrongfully discharge in-house counsel and avoid liability by asserting the
attorney-client privilege is against the spirit and purpose of the privilege.
Extension of the tort of retaliatory discharge to in-house counsel will advance
the public policy reasons of the tort, which is designed to protect society from
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5. DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 10 (2d ed. 2004).
6. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (2004).
7. John Jacob Kobus, Jr., Note, Establishing Corporate Counsel’s Right to Sue for
Retaliatory Discharge, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1343, 1387 (1995); see also Balla v. Gambro, 584
N.E.2d 104, 113 (Ill. 1991).
8. 423 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2005).
9. SUP. CT. STANDARD 503(d)(3), 56 F.R.D. 183, 235-40 (1972).  In order to understand
the utility of the Supreme Court Standards, their history is worth noting:
XXSupreme Court Standards are not part of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  The
Supreme Court originally proposed the Standards as Rules, but Congress struck
them before enacting the other proposed Rules into law.  However, Supreme
Court Standard 503 restates, rather than modifies, the common law lawyer-client
privilege.  Thus, it has considerable utility as a guide to the federal common law
referred to in Rule 501 . . . .
3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 503.02,
at 503-10 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2006).
corporate impropriety.5  An attorney has an ethical duty to report corporate
misconduct that might place an individual or society as a whole in a serious
threat of imminent danger.6  An attorney, however, is undeniably placed in a
difficult situation when forced to choose between ethical duties and the threat of
losing his or her livelihood.7  Allowing an attorney the opportunity to recover in
tort like other whistleblowers would not only add incentive to report corporate
misconduct, but also provide a level of protection that is afforded to other
employees.
This note will analyze the Fifth Circuit opinion in Willy v. Administrative
Review Board,8 which allowed in-house counsel to waive the attorney-client
privilege and bring an offensive suit for wrongful termination.  Part II of this
note discusses the ethical concerns and current case law regarding offensive
claims by in-house counsel.  Part III provides a summary of the Willy decision.
Part IV.A suggests that the Fifth Circuit correctly decided the case by
interpreting the applicable precedents and finding a federal breach of duty
exception under Supreme Court Standard 5039 and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.  Furthermore, Part IV.B emphasizes how the court’s
seeming assault on the attorney-client privilege may in fact strengthen the
privilege’s goal of compliance with the law while encouraging procedural rights
of attorneys.  Part IV.C provides a proposed means of allowing privilege waiver
and offensive suits by in-house counsel while protecting the identity of the
defendant-corporation and minimizing the adverse effects to the attorney-client
relationship.  This note concludes in Part V.
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10. Arthur Garwin, Confidentiality and Its Relationship to the Attorney-Client Privilege,
in ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION: PROTECTING AND DEFENDING
CONFIDENTIALITY 31, 31 (Vincent S. Walkowiak ed., 3d ed. 2004).
11. Id. (quoting 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING § 9.2, at 9-6 (3d ed. Supp. 2003)).
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmts. (2004).
13. Garwin, supra note 10, at 32.
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6.
15. Garwin, supra note 10, at 32-33.
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b).
II. Current Law of Privilege Waiver and Offensive Suits by In-House Counsel
A. Ethical Obligations vs. Evidentiary Rules
Concerns regarding an attorney waiving privilege to bring an offensive action
involve both the rules of evidence as well as the rules of ethics.  Concededly, the
two are closely related, but not identical.10  The evidentiary rule of attorney-
client privilege “protects only against compelled disclosure, and only against
disclosure of information communicated between client and lawyer.”11  On the
other hand, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) cover a much
broader scope by dealing with confidentiality and ethics while applying to all
information related to representation and to all representational contexts.12
Accordingly, anything covered by the attorney-client privilege is also protected
by the MRPC, while many things covered by the MRPC are not covered by the
attorney-client privilege.13  This Part discusses this distinction between the
ethical and evidentiary rules.  Next, Part II.B.1 briefly discusses the tort of
retaliatory discharge.  Finally, Part II.B.2 provides an explanation of the three
judicial approaches to offensive suits by in-house counsel, including the
traditional approach that strictly prohibits offensive claims and the current trend
of allowing offensive claims with privilege waiver by in-house counsel.  
MRPC 1.6 is the rule on point for attorney-client confidentiality.  MRPC
1.6(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless” there is informed consent from the client,
implied authorization from the client, or one of six exceptions stated in part (b)
of the rule.14  Originally, MRPC 1.6 only included exceptions “to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm” or “to establish a claim or
defense on behalf of the lawyer.”15  Recent developments, however, have
brought amendments that include the crime-fraud exception and exceptions for
compliance with rules or court orders.16  
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17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. Garwin, supra note 10, at 38.
19. Id. (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-424
(2001)).
20. Id.
21. See Willy v. Admin. Review Bd., 423 F.3d 483, 500 (5th Cir. 2005); O’Brien v. Stolt-
Nielsen Transp. Group Ltd., 838 A.2d 1076, 1086 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003).
22. FED. R. EVID. 501.
23. See id.; Willy, 423 F.3d at 495. 
24. EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 20 (4th ed. 2001) (noting that while the choice of law is not normally a factor, there
are some notable differences from state to state).
This note is primarily concerned with MRPC 1.6(b)(5), which allows
disclosure by an attorney “to establish a claim or defense.”17  The claim
exception is generally invoked when an attorney is attempting to collect a fee.18
The clear language of the exception, however, may be interpreted to allow other
claims to be brought by an attorney.  In fact, the American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (ABA) recently
noted “that a retaliatory discharge or similar claim by a former in-house lawyer
against her employer is a claim under Rule 1.6(b).”19  The ABA’s comments
provide that an offensive claim against a former employer should not be
considered unethical nor should the claim subject an attorney to discipline.20
Perhaps more importantly, for purposes of this note, the ABA’s ethical stance on
this topic has persuaded some courts to allow more evidentiary privilege waivers
when an attorney wishes to bring a retaliatory claim against a former employer.21
Although ethical concerns are generally governed by principles based on the
MRPC, the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) govern what material is subject to
the attorney-client privilege, and therefore, what is admissible or excludable in
trial.  Specifically, FRE 501 determines that unless required by the Constitution
or rules handed down from Congress or the Supreme Court, “privilege . . . shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by
the courts of the United States,” with the exception that state law shall control
in state proceedings and in federal diversity cases.22  Stated differently, FRE 501
codifies a federal common law of privilege which is determinative in cases
involving federal question jurisdiction, while allowing state law to control in all
other actions.23  Notably, the evidentiary rule of attorney-client privilege creates
a possibility of inconsistent outcomes depending upon whether federal or state
law applies.24
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25. Kobus, supra note 7, at 1344.
26. Id. at 1345.
27. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 5, at 8-10.
28. Id. at 10-12.
29. Kobus, supra note 7, at 1345-47.
30. See EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 20; see also Lane, supra note 1, at 237.
31. See Lane, supra note 1, at 237-46.
32. Id.
B. Case Law Concerning Offensive Claims and Privilege Waivers by
Attorneys
1. The Tort of Retaliatory Discharge
Before examining how courts handle tortious retaliatory discharge claims by
attorneys and in-house counsel, a basic understanding of the policy reasons and
justification for the tort will be helpful.  Historically, employment has been “at
will” and could be terminated by either an employer or employee for any
reason.25  Nonetheless, courts have recognized that while an employer can
terminate an employee for any reason or without just cause, an employer should
not be able to terminate an employee for the wrong reason — such as in
retaliation for an employee reporting corporate misconduct that is in violation
of federal or state law.26  In the late 1960s, amid corporate scandals, social
activists pioneered a push for internal corporate governance through
whistleblowers and whistleblower protection.27  In response, legislatures enacted
whistleblower statutes and courts enacted public policy exceptions to protect
employees that were terminated in retaliation for reporting illegal corporate
conduct.28  The result of the whistleblower movement has been recognition of
a tort of retaliatory discharge that is grounded in the desire to protect society
from corporate misconduct while providing a remedy for employees that are
terminated for reporting the illegal activity.29
2. The Judicial Approach to Offensive Claims by Attorneys
As noted above, the possibility of differing outcomes based on whether the
federal common law of privilege or the state law of privilege applies is apparent
when viewing how courts have handled attempts by in-house counsel to bring
offensive claims against former employers.30  Generally, courts have dealt with
an attorney’s cause of action against a former employer in one of three ways.31
First, some courts have found that attorneys may never bring a claim against a
former employer because of the special fiduciary relationship between an
attorney and client and because of societal protections afforded by ethical rules.32
Second, other courts have allowed attorneys to bring an offensive claim as long
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33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See infra Part IV.C.
36. See Meredith v. C.E. Walther, Inc., 422 So. 2d 761 (Ala. 1982); Ausman v. Arthur
Andersen, L.L.P., 810 N.E.2d 566 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); McGonagle v. Union Fid. Corp., 556
A.2d 878 (Pa. 1989).
37. 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 107.
40. Id. at 108.
41. Id. at 109.
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
as the attorney does not have to use privileged material to state a cause of
action.33  Under this approach, if an attorney cannot prove his or her case without
using privileged material, then the claim must fail.  Finally, a growing trend
allows attorneys to bring the action and waive privilege if necessary to state a
claim.34  This note advocates the promotion of this current trend for all cases,
including actions in state court and actions under the federal common law of
privilege.  Even so, this note acknowledges the importance of protecting
privileged communication and advocates a standardized procedure designed to
protect client confidences.35
a) The Traditional Approach: No Offensive Claims by Any Means
The first — and traditional — approach to offensive claims would disallow
an attorney from ever bringing an offensive action against a former employer.36
The seminal case stating this view is Balla v. Gambro,37 an Illinois case based
on state law.38  The Balla majority recognized that Balla had a valid retaliatory
discharge claim mandated by public policy,39 but found that he should not be
able to bring the claim because of the detriment that extending the tort would
have on the attorney-client relationship and because the court determined that the
ethical rules of attorneys, by themselves, would protect society from corporate
misdealing.40  The court noted that “[i]n-house counsel do not have a choice of
whether to follow their ethical obligations as attorneys . . . or follow the illegal
and unethical demands of their clients.”41  Therefore, the court held extension of
the tort of retaliatory discharge to an attorney unnecessary because an attorney
is already obligated to report corporate crime or fraud that might harm society.42
The court further reasoned that because society is protected by an attorney’s
ethical obligations, the only possible outcome from extending the tort to
attorneys would be “an undesirable effect on the attorney-client relationship.”43
The court noted that “[e]mployers might be hesitant to turn to their in-house
counsel for advice regarding potentially questionable corporate conduct knowing
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44. Id.
45. Id. at 113 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 115.
48. See Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d 364 (5th Cir.
1998); Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994); GTE Prod. Corp. v.
Stewart, 653 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1995); Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498
(Minn. 1991).  
49. Lane, supra note 1, at 241-42.
that their in-house counsel could use this information in a retaliatory discharge
suit.”44
Courts following the Balla approach rely on the faulty assumption that the
ethical duties of attorneys protect society from corporate impropriety without
extending a remedy of tortious retaliatory discharge to in-house counsel.  In fact,
the Balla dissent disagreed with this assumption: “[T]o say that the categorical
nature of ethical obligations is sufficient to ensure that the ethical obligations
will be satisfied simply ignores reality.”45  The dissent further reasoned that just
because an attorney is ethically obligated to report impropriety, the decision is
no less difficult for an attorney than any other employee.46  The corporation still
maintains the power to unfairly terminate the employment relationship, to leave
the attorney unemployed, and to possibly cause irreparable harm to the
attorney’s reputation.47  Disallowing an offensive claim by an attorney simply
because the attorney has an ethical obligation to report misconduct places the
attorney in an unnecessary predicament when the attorney realizes he or she will
have no remedy for retaliatory discharge.  Thus, recognizing that every other
employee is allowed a remedy if discharged in retaliation for reporting
misconduct, and that an in-house counsel is forbidden the opportunity simply
because of her profession and ethical obligations, the traditional approach is not
only unjust to the attorney, but is also unsound policy for the protection of
society.
b) A Limited Cause of Action
The second approach taken by some courts is to allow a claim by in-house
counsel, but to strictly limit the claim and often disallow privileged materials to
substantiate a cause of action.48  This approach recognizes that an attorney
should not be estopped from bringing a claim of retaliatory discharge against his
or her employer simply because of the nature of the attorney’s employment, but
requires the claim to be established without using privileged information and
attempts to give particular credence to preserving the fundamental values
underlying the attorney-client relationship.49  Courts accepting this view
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50. See Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 497; GTE Prod., 653 N.E.2d at 164-65.
51. See Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503-04; GTE Prod., 653 N.E.2d at 166-67.
52. Lane, supra note 1, at 244 (quoting Sally R. Weaver, Client Confidences in Disputes
Between In-House Attorneys and Their Employer-Clients: Much Ado About Nothing — Or
Something?, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483, 511-12 (1997)).
53. See Burkhart v. Semitool, Inc., 5 P.3d 1031 (Mont. 2000); Parker v. M & T Chems.,
Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Crews v. Buckman Labs. Int’l, Inc., 78
S.W.3d 852 (Tenn. 2002).
54. Willy v. Admin. Review Bd., 423 F.3d 483, 499 (5th Cir. 2005).
55. Lane, supra note 1, at 245.
56. Id. at 245-46.
57. Willy, 423 F.3d at 486-87.
recognize that allowing a retaliatory claim furthers public interest.50
Nevertheless, these courts conclude that protecting the attorney-client privilege
is more important than the interest in allowing offensive claims by in-house
counsel.51  Arguably, this approach “ha[s] failed to accord a meaningful cause
of action to in-house attorneys and, therefore, ha[s] failed to adequately support
the public policy that the tort of retaliatory discharge exists to protect.”52  In
other words, the reality of allowing an offensive claim but not a privilege waiver
does little to advance the Balla line of cases.
c) The New Trend: Allowing Offensive Claims with Privilege Waiver
The third approach allows in-house counsel to bring an offensive suit and to
waive privilege if necessary to state a claim.53  This is the approach applied in
Willy v. Administrative Review Board and advocated by this note.  This new
trend recognizes that “[t]here is no interest in allowing a corporation to conceal
wrongdoing, if in fact any has occurred.”54  The goal of privilege is to encourage
compliance with the law, not to provide a shield for criminal activity or
corporate impropriety.  The courts following this approach recognize that
disallowing a retaliatory discharge claim to an attorney would prevent the
attorney from having a forum to adjudicate his or her rights — a restriction that
may implicate due process violations.55  More importantly, these courts
emphasize that the remedy and incentives for a retaliatory discharge claim to
attorneys are more important than upholding privileged communication to a
guilty corporation.56
III. Statement of the Case: Willy v. Administrative Review Board
A. Events Leading to a Twenty-Year “Odyssey”
The facts in Willy involve two separate events that occurred while Donald
Willy was acting as in-house counsel for Coastal Corporation and Coastal States
Management (Coastal).57  These two incidents led to twenty years of
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58. Id. at 485.
59. Id. at 486.  
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id.  Willy’s conclusions were considered factually accurate, but it was argued that the
tone of the report was “inflammatory.”  Id.
63. Id. 
64. Id.
65. Id.  Willy claims that he received the “cold shoulder” after this incident.  Id.
66. Id.  The Corpus Christi Refinery is another subsidiary of Coastal.  Id.
67. Id.  Tensions were exceptionally high because Willy did not report this finding to Webb
and Webb considered the Corpus Christi Refinery “his turf.”  Id.
68. Id.  The supervisor decided not to reprimand Willy at the meeting because he was not
satisfied with Webb’s side of the story.  Id. at 486-87.
69. Id. at 487.
70. Id.
administrative reviews and multiple appeals to federal court before eventually
being settled in the current action.58  The first incident occurred when Willy
performed an environmental audit and wrote two reports for Belcher Oil
Company (Belcher), a wholly owned subsidiary of Coastal.59  Willy reported that
Belcher was in violation of several environmental statutes that would make them
susceptible to liability.60  There was some disagreement, however, amongst
Coastal employees about the accuracy of Willy’s conclusions.61  Specifically, a
co-worker of Willy, Troy Webb, sent a memo to Belcher’s president informing
him that Willy’s report may have overstated concerns for liability.62  Soon after
Webb’s memo, Willy’s supervisor asked him to revise his report and “to delete
reference to some of Belcher’s violations.”63  Willy, however, refused to change
the report and chose to discuss the issue with Coastal’s general counsel instead.64
At this meeting, the general counsel also disagreed with Willy and ultimately
changed the report himself.65
The second incident occurred when Willy contacted the Texas Department of
Water Resources (TDWR) about a closure bond for the Corpus Christi
Refinery.66  This phone call caused more tension between Willy and Webb
because Willy failed to inform Webb that, due to financial problems, the TDWR
had warned Willy that the refinery may have been subject to a lawsuit.67  After
this incident, the Coastal supervisor decided he needed to call a meeting to
relieve tensions between Willy and Webb.68  After this meeting, Willy’s
supervisor confirmed that Willy had made the call to the TDWR and decided
that action was needed.69  A final meeting resulted in Willy being fired for a
serious “breach of trust.”70  The contrast between these two events is important
because Coastal contends that Willy was fired for denying that he called the
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71. Id.
72. Id. (“Specifically, Willy sued under the Clean Air Act, the Water Pollution Act, the
Safe Drinking Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Toxic Substances
Control Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, . . . Compensation and Liability
Act . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
73. Id. at 494 n.48.
74. See id. at 489.
75. Id. at 496.  The court rejected Willy’s claim challenging the constitutionality of the
Administrative Review Board under the Appointments Clause.  Id. at 494.  Also, after finding
the reports admissible under the breach of duty exception, the court declined to review Willy’s
other arguments that Coastal waived attorney-client privilege when it placed the report at issue
in litigation and that the report was admissible under the crime fraud exception.  Id. at 496 n.58.
76. Id. at 495.
77. See id. at 496.
78. Id. at 497.  See generally Siedle v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 147 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1998).
79. Siedle, 147 F.3d at 11.
80. Willy, 423 F.3d at 497. 
TDWR at the Christi Refinery and for not reporting the call, while Willy
contends that he was fired in part for the Belcher report.71
B. The Fifth Circuit Hands Willy the Sword
After his termination, Willy filed a complaint with the Department of Labor,
alleging he was terminated in response to the Belcher report and that Coastal was
in violation of environmental whistleblower statutes.72  In order to state a claim,
Willy needed admission of the Belcher reports, which both Willy and Coastal
stipulated were subject to the attorney-client privilege.73  The Administrative
Review Board (ARB) determined that an attorney could not waive privilege in
order to bring an offensive claim.74  On appeal, however, the Willy court agreed
with Willy that the reports were admissible under the breach of duty exception
to the attorney-client privilege.75
When analyzing the case, the Willy court concluded that the federal law of
privilege applied because the case was brought before the court on federal
question jurisdiction concerning federal whistleblower statutes.76  Next, the court
found that rules in the Supreme Court Standard and MRPC create a federal
breach of duty exception that allows an attorney to waive privilege to bring an
offensive claim.77  After finding a federal breach of duty exception, the court
rejected the ARB’s insistence on following the First Circuit’s holding in Siedle
v. Putnam Investments, Inc.,78 which stated that an attorney could only use the
breach of duty exception as a defensive measure.79  Instead of following this
reasoning, the Willy court found that an attorney merely cannot use privilege
waiver simultaneously as both a shield and a sword.80
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81. 709 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1983).
82. Willy, 423 F.3d at 498-500.
83. Id. at 499.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 501.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 500-01.
89. Id.
Finally, the Willy court focused its attention on Doe v. A Corp.,81 another Fifth
Circuit case based on federal law.82  The ARB had dismissed reliance on Doe
because the facts in Doe did not require privilege waiver.83  The Willy court,
however, took this opportunity to clarify that Doe was not intended to
distinguish actions requiring privilege waiver from actions that did not.84
Instead, Doe was meant to stand for the proposition that an attorney is not barred
from bringing an action against a former employer under any circumstance,
including cases where an attorney can waive privilege under a defined
exception.85
After discarding reliance on Siedle and clarifying the Fifth Circuit’s previous
holding in Doe, the Willy court found that the federal breach of duty exception
created by Supreme Court Standard 503(d) would allow Willy to waive privilege
and bring an offensive claim against Coastal.86  Unfortunately, the court took one
final step to limit its holding to the facts of Willy.  Specifically, the court limited
its decision to actions “under the federal whistleblower statutes when the action
is before an [Administrative Law Judge],”87 and implied that the case might have
been decided differently if the suit involved public proceedings.88
IV. Implications of the Fifth Circuit Decision
A. The Court’s Decision
The Willy court correctly followed the trend of allowing offensive suits and
privilege waiver by in-house counsel.  The court recognized that allowing
privilege waiver to in-house counsel for retaliatory discharge actions will protect
societal interests under federal whistleblower statutes.  The position taken by the
Willy court is not only correct for policy reasons, but also soundly reasoned
under a recognized exception to privilege and applicable precedent.  In fact, the
only unfortunate result of Willy is that the court did not do more to allow
offensive suits and privilege waiver for claims of retaliatory discharge.
Specifically, the court’s limited holding and explicit warning that the case might
have been decided differently if the suit involved public proceedings is
disappointing for two reasons.89  
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90. See id. at 499-501.
91. See Burkhart v. Semitool, Inc., 5 P.3d 1031 (Mont. 2000); Parker v. M & T Chems.,
Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Crews v. Buckman Labs. Int’l, Inc., 78
S.W.3d 852 (Tenn. 2002).
First, the Willy court recognized that disallowing privilege waiver and
retaliatory discharge claims by in-house counsel would impede attorneys’
procedural rights and provide protection for guilty corporations.90  Because the
court clearly recognized that public policy favored allowing a claim for
retaliatory discharge, the court should have broadly allowed offensive claims and
focused on providing other measures to protect corporate identity and limit
possible adverse effects on the attorney-client privilege stemming from privilege
waiver.  Allowing broad use of privilege waiver and providing precautionary
measures to protect corporate identity appeared to be the next logical step for the
Willy court, especially considering the favorable discussion of these
precautionary measures provided by both Siedle v. Putnam Investments, Inc. and
Doe v. A Corp., which were both scrutinized by the Willy court.  Furthermore,
Doe is another Fifth Circuit case that provided a model of protection for
corporate clients while allowing offensive claims by in-house counsel.  The
Willy court’s narrow holding and failure to extend the protectionist measures in
Doe may in fact discourage other courts from following the Doe model.  The
Willy court’s reliance on Doe, coupled with the recognition of a federal breach
of duty exception to privilege, makes the court’s narrow holding to the facts of
Willy an inexplicable disappointment.
Second, the Willy court failed to capitalize on its unique opportunity to
consider the first case of privilege waiver by in-house counsel to bring an
offensive action under the federal common law of evidence.  Other courts
allowing privilege waiver have based their decisions on state law and state
evidentiary rules.91  Instead of trying to provide a narrow holding, this unique
opportunity could have bound the Fifth Circuit when dealing with offensive
claims under federal common law cases and provided a solid foundation for
other federal law cases in other circuits.  Moreover, a more expansive holding
would have bolstered the current trend allowing privilege waiver for offensive
suits and acted as a guidepost for states that are still looking to decide or
reconsider the issue.  While the Willy court did correctly decide the case on
precedent and policy grounds, the Fifth Circuit missed a landmark opportunity
to provide guidance to other jurisdictions.
1. Interpretation of Precedent
Because jurisdiction was founded on the federal question of whistleblower
statutes, the Willy court determined that the federal common law of privilege was
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controlling.92  This made FRE 501 determinative as to whether an exception to
privilege existed and whether an attorney could bring an offensive suit.  As
noted above, FRE 501 creates a federal common law of privilege different from
state law and determined by the courts of the United States and rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court.93  This allowed the Willy court to follow Supreme Court
Standard 503(d), which creates an exception when a client breaches a duty to his
attorney.94  Specifically, the express breach of duty exception in Supreme Court
Standard 503(d)(3) finds no privilege “[a]s to a communication relevant to an
issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client or by the client to his
lawyer.”95  Following the explicit language of the rule, the Willy court correctly
found a federal breach of duty exception to the attorney-client privilege.  Further,
the Willy court was also persuaded by the ABA’s stance that an attorney bringing
an offensive claim against his former employer is not unethical.96
Next, the Willy court analyzed the ARB’s reliance on Siedle v. Putnam
Investments, Inc.97  The Siedle court, following the current trend of allowing
privilege waiver and offensive claims by in-house counsel, would have allowed
Siedle the use of privileged material if the material had come under a recognized
exception.98  The Siedle court, however, explicitly rejected the possibility that an
attorney could bring an offensive claim under a breach of duty exception.99  In
its opinion, the Willy court dismissed any reliance on Siedle because Siedle was
a diversity action decided on Massachusetts state law and not the federal
common law of privilege.100  Furthermore, the Willy court refused to find the
Siedle reasoning as even a persuasive precedent and criticized the Siedle court
for misinterpreting the case law upon which it relied.101  Perhaps just as
importantly, the Willy court emphasized that the Siedle case centered on whether
a seal order should be lifted on privileged material that had been entered into
evidence, not whether an attorney could bring an offensive suit.102  Recognizing
that Siedle was based on Massachusetts state law and primarily dealing with
whether to lift a seal order, the Willy court was correct to disregard the ARB’s
reliance on the Siedle holding and to focus on Doe v. A Corp. 
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As mentioned above, Doe was decided on the federal common law of
privilege just twelve years earlier.103  While the original Doe holding allowed
offensive suits by attorneys under a breach of duty exception, the ARB refused
to rely on Doe because the Fifth Circuit had not specified that privilege waiver
was acceptable when bringing an offensive claim.104  Fortunately, the Willy court
clarified the ambiguity in Doe by confirming that privilege waiver coupled with
an offensive claim is permitted when an exception to privilege exists.  After
determining which precedent was relevant and clarifying its previous holding in
Doe, the Willy court was able to craft an opinion in line with the needs of public
policy, which demand offensive claims by attorneys.  Nevertheless, the court
failed to capitalize on its well reasoned opinion by limiting its holding to the rare
facts in Willy.
2. An Exception by Another Name
Although the Willy court was able to decide the case by correctly interpreting
the relevant precedent and supporting the decision with rules such as the MRPC
and Supreme Court Standard 503, the court may have been able to allow Willy’s
claim under the widely accepted crime-fraud exception or under a special
exception for public policy.  The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege generally provides that “privilege do[es] not extend to communications
with a lawyer which are intended to be in furtherance of a presently occurring
or planned illegality.”105  Communications about a crime or fraud that occurred
in the past are not exempted from privilege.106  Since changing the Belcher report
would have been in furtherance of a crime, the crime-fraud exception would
have been applicable to the reports if changing the reports was found to be a
violation of the federal whistleblower statute or otherwise fraudulent.  The Willy
court, however, found the breach of duty exception to be applicable, and
therefore, there are insufficient facts in the opinion to determine whether or not
the crime-fraud exception would also apply.
Even though the breach of duty exception was found to exist and a factual
determination may have also included a crime-fraud exception to the privileged
reports, the Willy court could have also found a public policy exception that
would have allowed Willy to waive privilege and bring an offensive suit against
Coastal.  A public policy exception would be applicable because Willy claimed
he was fired for an internal report that indicated a Coastal subsidiary was in
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violation of environmental statutes.107  These environmental statutes were
enacted for the protection of society.  In turn, whistleblower statutes were
enacted to protect employees that reported impropriety by corporations failing
to comply with the environmental statutes.  Public policy should infer that all
whistleblowers should be able to state a cause of action if discharged for
retaliatory purposes.  An attorney should not be barred from bringing a suit
because of a fiduciary relationship or because she would have to waive privilege
to state a claim.  Likewise, disallowing a claim by in-house counsel or
disallowing privilege waivers is tantamount to allowing guilty corporations to
violate the policy justifications for environmental statutes.  The Willy court could
have concluded that disallowing Willy’s claim for retaliatory discharge, when
he was trying to protect a public interest, would violate public policy.  This
conclusion would have been sound considering that forty-five jurisdictions have
found a public policy exception for retaliatory discharge.108  Therefore, the Willy
court could have concluded that public policy requires extension of the tort of
retaliatory discharge to attorneys and that privilege waiver is necessary under the
public policy exception.
B. Implications on the Attorney-Client Privilege and In-House
Communication
Reluctance of some courts to allow privilege waiver and offensive suits by
attorneys stems from the respected tradition and goals of the attorney-client
privilege.  The privilege is intended to promote candid communications between
attorney and client and to facilitate the client’s faith in the attorney’s ability to
safeguard the client’s secrets.109  Theoretically, decisions that limit the privilege
will result in less candid communication and limit a client’s faith in his attorney.
Some courts have disallowed an attorney’s cause of action against his or her
former employer predominantly on the basis that allowing the suit will result in
clients being “less willing to be forthright and candid with their in-house
counsel.”110  The fear is that a corporation may not involve legal counsel on
some decisions because counsel will later be able to use the same information
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
652 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:637
111. Id. at 110.
112. Willy, 423 F.3d at 501.
113. See Sara A. Corello, Note, In-House Counsel’s Right to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 389, 411 (1992).
114. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional
Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 478 (1977).  Implementation of a balancing test may be
more justified in the context of a corporate attorney-client privilege because the “certainty” of
privilege is already limited by vague rules defined by the control group and subject matter tests.
Id. at 473-74.  Furthermore, a corporation is normally more financially driven and more attuned
to dealing with uncertainty.  Id.
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116. See Corello, supra note 113, at 417-18 (noting that a major concern when allowing
retaliatory suits by in-house counsel is that the corporation will be less willing to communicate
in a suit against the corporation.111  Consequently, the possibility of these
negative effects should require a court to use a heightened level of scrutiny any
time they consider a case that will limit the scope of the attorney-client privilege.
 This section explores how the Willy court largely ignored any analysis of the
potential negative effects which may arise from privilege waiver and avoided
balancing the positive and negative consequences of a broader holding.  Further,
this section provides that the potential negative consequences of allowing
privilege waiver may be exaggerated or even illusory in the context of the
corporate attorney-client privilege.
In Willy, the court simply concluded that there was no per se ban on offensive
suits by in-house counsel when the case is in front of an Administrative Law
Judge.112  This conclusion was made without acknowledging the adverse effects
that may come from allowing privilege waiver.  Despite the Willy court’s cursory
analysis of the negative effects that allowing privilege waiver might have on in-
house communication, the court still reached the correct conclusion.
Undeniably, privilege waiver should not be allowed without a high degree of
scrutiny.  Nonetheless, privilege should also not act as a complete bar to the
admission of evidence.113  In all practicality, the implementation of a balancing
test may be needed to discern when privilege waiver should be allowed and
when it should not.114  The test should balance the need for privilege waiver
against the legitimate adverse effects of allowing privilege waiver.115  In the case
of retaliatory discharge, the balance shifts in favor of allowing privilege waiver
to state a claim.
The Willy court should have acknowledged the possible negative effects of
allowing privilege waiver, including: decreased communication between
management and counsel, a diminution of faith in the attorney to protect some
secrets, and perhaps, even a decreased level of internal audits and
investigations.116  Undoubtedly, these possible adverse effects could lead to
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several troubling scenarios.  For instance, a decrease in candor and
communication between the client and attorney or a decrease in internal auditing
might result in an increase in illegal conduct.117  The fear is that the increase in
illegality may not even be willful, but instead, may arise from the legal
ignorance that results from the absence of counsel.118
While decisions made without legal counsel and contrary to the law are
troubling, a great fear of the increase of illegality may be unfounded for two
principal reasons.  First, these negative effects are only possible or theoretical.119
Debate exists as to whether or not a client’s actions would noticeably change
even if privilege waiver was allowed.120  A second factor casting doubt on
increased illegality is that the economic costs of not implementing internal
auditing are so great that corporations will almost certainly continue to perform
them.121  Because auditing and frank communication are not likely to be limited
in the corporate setting, the ability of a corporation to skew the results of all
audits would be greatly limited by extending the protection of a tort claim for
retaliatory discharge to auditors such as in-house counsel.122
On the other end of the balancing test are the rights of attorneys and the
continued safety of the public.  Allowing privilege waiver and offensive claims
by in-house counsel will afford attorneys an opportunity to adjudicate their
claim.  In many cases, disallowing privilege waiver would make it impossible
for counsel to state a claim or prove their case.123  Therefore, without privilege
waiver, a corporation could wrongfully discharge in-house counsel without any
repercussions.  Disallowing attorneys a forum to adjudicate their rights stands
in direct contradiction to the policies in place to protect society from corporate
impropriety.124  In-house counsel are undoubtedly less inclined to report
corporate misconduct when the corporation can easily discharge them and leave
them without a legal remedy.125  Allowing privilege waiver and offensive claims
for retaliatory discharge, on the other hand, will encourage whistleblowing by
attorneys and will advance the goals of protecting society from corporate
misconduct.126  In fact, because of attorneys’ unique ability to access sensitive
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materials and information, they may be in a better position to thwart criminality
that will lead to social harm.127  After weighing the possible consequences on the
attorney client relationship against the extra protection afforded to attorneys and
society as a whole, the scales tip in favor of allowing privilege waiver to bring
offensive claims for retaliatory discharge.  
While the Willy court largely ignored this balancing analysis, the court’s
decision to allow privilege waiver was still correct.  Additionally, had the court
not limited its holding, the result may have strengthened the utilitarian objective
of the attorney-client privilege, which is compliance with the law.  The court,
perhaps in a desire to avoid this balancing analysis, opted instead to limit the
holding to non-public proceedings and utterly failed to provide meaningful
guidance to other courts.
C. Proposed Means of Allowing Offensive Suits for Retaliatory Discharge
As shown above, allowing in-house counsel to waive privilege and bring a
claim against a former employer may actually strengthen the underlying
principles of the privilege and also provide attorneys a forum to adjudicate their
rights and an incentive to report corporate impropriety.  Furthermore, after
balancing the incentives created by allowing offensive claims against the
possible negative effects on corporate communication and the attorney-client
privilege, a determination must be made that offensive claims for retaliatory
discharge should be allowed.  In fact, this note advocates extending the position
of the Willy court by allowing all offensive claims for retaliatory discharge by
in-house counsel, rather than only allowing those claims in cases brought before
an administrative court.  This note further advocates the enactment of a three-
prong procedural test designed to manage all offensive claims for retaliatory
discharge that are brought by former in-house counsel.  The procedural test
operates on the premise that all retaliatory discharge claims by in-house counsel
are to be allowed.  The test, however, incorporates procedural safeguards
including an in camera hearing, a trial under anonymity, and a closed record to
protect the defendant-corporation.  These steps are aimed not only at promoting
the benefits of allowing offensive claims, but also at minimizing any harsh
effects that may result to the client-attorney relationship.
After recognizing that a bright-line rule allowing privilege waiver for all cases
involving retaliatory discharge must be implemented,128 the first part of the test
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would be initiated by a pretrial, in camera hearing.129  The in camera hearing is
an integral component of the first part of this test, because it will ensure the least
intrusive means of establishing how the case should advance.130  Further, the
initial hearing will allow the judge to determine whether a valid claim has been
stated and whether the plaintiff-attorney must waive the attorney-client privilege
to state a claim.  If the plaintiff-attorney can state a claim without waiving
privilege, then the case will go to trial as normal and privileged material will
remain barred from the proceedings.  Furthermore, because confidences and
privileged information will not be at stake, the defendant-corporation will not be
afforded the benefits of the next two prongs of this proposed test.  On the
contrary, if the plaintiff-attorney needs to waive privilege in order to state a
claim, then the case will advance under anonymous party names and with a
closed record as provided in prongs two and three.
After finding that a claim has been made and privilege waiver invoked, the
next step is to begin a trial under anonymity.  A trial under anonymity is the key
to providing protection to the client-attorney confidences that may be lost by
allowing offensive claims.  Undeniably, the largest concern in allowing
offensive claims by in-house counsel is the harm it may have on
communications with counsel in critical situations.131  The concern is that the
client-corporation will not speak candidly with counsel and entrust secrets that
the attorney may later use in an action against the corporation.132  Client-
corporations also fear that allowing an attorney to bring a suit may generate
negative publicity and attention toward the corporation.133  The best way to
prevent damage from negative publicity while still allowing the claim to proceed
is to perform the trial under anonymity.  For example, in Doe v. A Corp., the
court found that an offensive action should be allowed, but that the parties could
be protected by a level of anonymity.134  The anonymity advocated in Doe
provides an integral part of the three-prong test aimed at balancing the need to
allow offensive claims, while protecting confidences currently afforded by the
attorney-client privilege.  
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The final part of the test is to provide a closed record.  The primary purpose
of the closed record is to provide a second layer of protection to the corporation.
The corporation’s identity should be completely protected by the anonymity
factor and a closed record.  Protecting the identity of the corporation and sealing
the record should afford all the protections of secrecy that the attorney-client
privilege is in place to protect.  Granted, the corporation is still subject to
liability, but the privilege is not in place to protect criminal or tortious activity.
If the corporation has terminated in-house counsel in retaliation for reporting
misconduct, then the corporation should be liable for the tort.  The corporation
should not be allowed to hide behind the attorney-client privilege.  Instead, the
attorney should have an opportunity to prove the case, and the corporation
should have the opportunity to defend the action.
The application of this three-prong test should provide the most equitable
results when in-house counsel wishes to waive privilege in order to bring an
offensive claim for retaliatory discharge.  Simply allowing privilege waiver, or
just as quickly dismissing the action by in-house counsel, are inappropriate
means of handling these types of suits.  In fact, recognition of the importance of
allowing these suits versus the consequential effects on the attorney-client
relationship requires further consideration of how to handle these cases.
Applying a bright-line rule that always allows offensive suits for retaliatory
discharge, but also takes steps to provide layers of protection for the identity of
the corporation, will provide the most beneficial results to society.
V. Conclusion
In Willy v. Administrative Review Board, the Fifth Circuit held that there was
not a per se ban on an attorney’s ability to waive privilege and bring an
offensive suit against his or her employer.  The court correctly determined that
a breach of duty exception exists under the federal common law of privilege and
that societal interests require allowing retaliatory discharge actions by in-house
counsel.  Unfortunately, the court failed to maximize the opportunity to expand
whistleblower rights to in-house counsel in all situations and hinted that the
result may have been different if the case had been in a public proceeding and
not in front of an Administrative Law Judge.  In addition to recognizing the
importance of extending the tort of retaliatory discharge to in-house counsel and
allowing privilege waiver to prove the claim, the Willy court should have also
provided guidelines for allowing these actions, which would have included an
in camera hearing, a trial under anonymity, and a closed record.
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